Network routing games, and more generally congestion games play a central role in algorithmic game theory, comparable to the role of the traveling salesman problem in combinatorial optimization. It is known that the price of anarchy is independent of the network topology for non-atomic congestion games. In other words, it is independent of the structure of the strategy spaces of the players, and for a ne cost functions it equals 4/3. In this paper, we show that the dependence of the price of anarchy on the network topology is considerably more intricate for atomic congestion games. More specifically, we consider congestion games with a ne cost functions where the strategy spaces of players are symmetric and equal to the set of bases of a k-uniform matroid. In this setting, we show that the price of anarchy is strictly larger than the price of anarchy for singleton strategy spaces where the latter is 4/3. As our main result we show that the price of anarchy can be bounded from above by 28/13 ¥ 2.15. This constitutes a substantial improvement over the price of anarchy bound 5/2, which is known to be tight for arbitrary network routing games with a ne cost functions. 
Introduction
Understanding the impact of selfish behavior on the performance of a system is an important question in algorithmic game theory. One of the cornerstones of the substantial literature on this topic is the famous result of Roughgarden and Tardos [26] . They considered the tra c model of Wardrop [29] in a network with a ne flow-dependent congestion cost functions on the edges. Given a set of commodities, each specified by a source node, a target node, and a flow demand, a Wardrop equilibrium is a multicommodity flow with the property that every commodity uses only paths that minimize the cost. For this setting, Roughgarden and Tardos proved that the total cost of an equilibrium flow is not worse than 4/3 times that of a system optimum. This ratio was coined the price of anarchy by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [18] who introduced it as a measure of a system's performance degradation due to selfish behavior. A surprising consequence of the result of Roughgarden and Tardos is that the worst case price of anarchy in congested networks is attained for very simple single-commodity networks already considered a century ago by Pigou [22] . Pigou-style networks consist of only two nodes connected by two parallel links. In fact, Roughgarden [25] proved that for any set of cost functions, the price of anarchy is independent of the network topology as it is always
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A model closely related to Wardrop's model is that of a congestion game with unsplittable (i.e., atomic) players. In such a game, there is a finite set of players and a strategy of each player is to choose a set of resources allowable to her. Without any restrictions on the strategy spaces, the price of anarchy for a ne cost functions is 5/2 as shown by Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [9] and Awerbuch et al. [5] . As a contrast, for simple Pigou-style instances with symmetric and singleton strategies, Lücking et al. [19] showed that the price of anarchy is only 4/3. These results imply that for atomic congestion games the price of anarchy does depend on the combinatorial structure of the players' strategies.
In this work, we shed new light on the impact of the combinatorial structure of strategy spaces on the ine ciency of equilibria in atomic congestion games. Specifically, we focus on the minimum combinatorial structure that one may think of, namely symmetric k-uniform congestion games where the strategy set of each player consists of all subsets of resources with exactly k elements. These games are a natural generalization of the singleton case and model, e.g., load balancing scenarios where each player controls several jobs, see also Abed et al. [1] for a related model in the context of coordination mechanisms.
Our Results
As our main result we prove that the price of anarchy in congestion games with a ne cost functions is at most 28/13 when strategy spaces are symmetric and bases of a k-uniform matroid. The proof uses in its core several combinatorial arguments on the amount and cost of resources that are over-respectively under-demanded in any given Nash equilibrium as opposed to an optimal solution. It also exploits the a nity of the cost functions, along the lines of earlier arguments of Fotakis [11] for the singleton case. The main point of the technical side of the paper is the insight that the combinatorial structure of strategy spaces, here of the simplest possible form, allows to furnish combinatorial arguments that yield improved results on the price of anarchy. We are not aware of earlier attempts in this direction, and believe this opens new possibilities for our understanding of a "classical" showcase problem in algorithmic game theory. We also show that the price of anarchy for the k-uniform matroid case cannot be the same as for singleton congestion games, as we bound it away from 4/3: For k large enough, the price of anarchy is at least 1.343 for a ne cost functions, for k = 5 it is at least 47/35 ¥ 1.3428. We note that larger lower bounds on the price of anarchy can be achieved for more general settings such as matroid strategy spaces, or non-a ne cost functions. They are not included in this paper, however.
Related Work
Since the early works of Pigou [22] , Beckman et al. [6] , and Braess [7] it is well known that user equilibria in congested networks may be suboptimal for the overall performance of the system. In order to quantify this ine ciency, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [18] proposed to study the ratio of the total cost of an equilibrium and the total cost of an optimal solution. This ratio is now known as the price of anarchy. Roughgarden and Tardos [26] showed that the price of anarchy for non-atomic games with a ne costs is 4/3. The worst case is attained for simple networks of two parallel links previously studied by Pigou [22] . Roughgarden [25] gave a closed form expression for the price of anarchy for arbitary cost functions which is again attained for Pigou-style networks, e.g., for polynomials with positive coe cient and maximum degree d the price of anarchy is of order (d/ ln(d)).
Awerbuch et al. [5] and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [9] considered the related model with atomic players that was introduced by Rosenthal [23] . They showed that for a ne cost functions the price of anarchy is 5/2. Aland et al. [4] gave tight bounds on the price of anarchy for polynomial cost functions with maximum degree d which behaves asymptotically as ((d/ ln d) d+1 ). It is interesting to note that these worst-case bounds are not attained for simple Pigou-style networks with symmetric and singleton strategies as in the non-atomic case. Based on previous work of Suri et al.
[27], Caragiannis et al. [8] showed that for a ne costs, the worst case is attained for asymmetric singleton strategies. For a similar result for polynomial costs, see Gairing and Schoppmann [14] . In fact, for singleton games with symmetric strategies, the price of anarchy is considerably better than in the general case. In fact, Fotakis [11] showed that the price of anarchy of symmetric singleton atomic games is equal to the price of anarchy of non-atomic games. This improves and generalizes previous bounds by Lücking et al. [19] and Gairing et al. [13] .
The class of k-uniform games that we consider in this paper is also related to the class of integer-splittable congestion games introduced by Rosenthal [24] and the classes of k-splittable and integer k-splittable congestion games studied by Meyers [20] . In contrast to our model, the models above allowed that a player uses a resource with multiple units of demand at the same time. It turns out that allowing for this kind of self-congestion has a severe impact on the existence of pure Nash equilibria [10, 24] but for networks of parallel links it is known that pure Nash equilibria are guranteed to exist [16, 28] .
The impact of combinatorial structure on the existence and computability of pure Nash equilibria in has been studied for many variants of congestion games. Ackermann et al. [2] proved that for atomic games with unweighted players all sequences of best replies converge in polynomial time to a pure Nash equilibrium if the set of strategies of each player corresponds to the set of bases of a matroid. For weighted congestion games, the matroid property guarantees the existence of a pure Nash equilibria [3] while without that property a pure Nash equilibrium may fail to exist [15] . Similarly, congestion games with player-specific costs and matroid strategies have a pure Nash equilibrium which can be computed e ciently [3] which is in contrast to the general case [21] . For similar results in the context of resource buying games, see also Harks and Peis [17] .
To the best of our knowledge, the impact of matroid structures on the e ciency of Nash equilibria has not been considered before. The only result in this direction is a a yet unpublished work of Fujishige et al. [12] . They showed that Braess' paradox cannot occur in non-atomic games with matroid strategies, i.e., the quality of the user equilibrium cannot deteriorate when removing a resource. This result, however, has no consequences for the ine ciency of equilbria in non-atmomic games since the worst case is attained for Pigou-style networks where the strategies are symmetric and 2-uniform matroids.
Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players and let R be a finite set of resources. Each player i is associated with a set of subsets of resources X i µ 2 R allowable to her. A strategy of a player is to choose a subset x i oe X i from this set. A strategy vector x = (x i ) ioeN consists of n strategies, one for each player. Every resource r is endowed with a cost function c r : N ae R that maps the total number of its users x r = |{i oe N : r oe x i }| to a cost value c r (x r ). The private cost of player i in strategy vector x is then defined as
We use standard game theory notation; for a strategy vector x oe X = X 1 ◊ · · · ◊ X n , a player i and an alternative strategy y i oe X i , we denote by (y i , x ≠i ) the strategy vector in which all players play as in x except for i who plays y i . A strategy vector x is a Nash equilibrium if,
for all i oe N and y i oe X i . Given an instance of a game I = (N, R, X, (c r ) roeR ), we denote the set of Nash equilibria of I by NE(I).
We are interested in how restrictions on the set of strategies of each player influence the ine ciency of equilibria. We measure the e ciency of a strategy vector x oe X in terms of the social costs C(x) defined as
We denote by OPT(I) the set of strategy vectors x that minimize C(x). For an instance I of a game, the price of anarachy is defined as
, where x OPT oe OPT(I) is a strategy vector minimizing C. For a class G of games, the price of anarachy is defined as
PoA(G) = sup
IoeG PoA(I). We drop G whenever it is clear from context. We are specifically interested in singleton and uniform matroid strategy spaces. A game is said to be a singleton game, if |x i | = 1 for all x i oe X i and i oe N . A game is called k-uniform game if for each player, there is a subset
Symmetric k-Uniform Games
The main result of this paper is the following upper bound on the price of anarchy of symmetric k-uniform matroid congestion games.
I Theorem 1. The price of anarchy of symmetric k-uniform matroid congestion games is at most
For the proof of Theorem 1, we are going to to prove that C(
given worst-case Nash equilibrium x NE and optimal solution x OPT , of an abritrary instance I of a k-uniform matroid congestion game. For the remainder of this section, fix an instance I, a worst-case Nash equilibrium x NE and a system optimal solution x OPT .
To gain some intuition on congestion games with k-uniform matroid strategies, let us first consider the following example of a k-uniform matroid congestion game that will serve as a running example throughout this section. Even though it has only a moderate price of anarchy of 16/14, it showcases the crucial structures that we exploit later in this section when proving Theorem 1. 
The cost function of the other five resources is the identity, i.e., c r (x) = x for all r oe {3, . . . , 7}. There are three players whose strategy is to choose exactly 4 resources, i.e., X i = {S µ R : |S| = 4} for all i oe {1, 2, 3}. In the system optimum, the two resources with constant costs are used by all players and each player chooses two of the remaining five resources, see the upper profile in Figure 1 . One of the resources with non-constant costs has to be used by two players leading to overall costs of 14. However, there is a Nash equilibrium, in which not all of the resources with constant costs are used by all players, see the lower profile in Figure 1 . This Nash equilibrium has a total cost of 16. The price of anarchy of this instance is 16/14 ¥ 1.14.
In order to derive bounds on the price of anarchy for the proof of Theorem 1, we bound the excess costs of the resources that are chosen by more players in the Nash equilibrium than in the system optimum in terms of the excess costs of the resources that are chosen by more players in the system optimum than in the Nash equilibrium. To this end, we denote by A the set of resources chosen by more players in x OPT than in x NE , and by B the set of resources chosen by more players in x NE than in x OPT , i.e.,
Henceforth, we call the resources in A are underdemanded and the resources in B are overdemanded. For an illustration, see also Figure 1 where the set of underdemanded resources is A = {2, 3} and the set of overdemanded resources is B = {4, 5}.
As we show in the following lemma, it is su cient to bound the excess costs of the resources in B in terms of the excess costs of of the resources in A in order to bound the price of anarchy.
I Lemma 3. For a symmetric k-uniform congestion game with a ne cost functions and A and B as in (1), we have
The proof is a rather straightforward generalization of a similar lemma due to Fotakis [11] for singleton games. It is contained in the appendix.
In order to use Lemma 3 for the proof of Theorem 1, we are interested in bounding q
. It is interesting to note that for symmetric singleton games, it holds that
for all r, r Õ oe R by the Nash inequality. This implies in particular that
which together with Lemma 3 implies an upper bound on the price of anarchy of 4/3. This is the road taken by Fotakis [11] in order to derive this bound. However, neither inequality (3) nor inequality (4) hold in k-uniform matroid congestion games due to the more complicated strategy spaces. E.g., for the Nash equilibrium x NE and system optimum x OPT in Figure 1 we have c 4 (x
). More generally speaking, inequality (4) does not hold if all players choosing an overloaded resource b oe B in x NE also choose an underloaded resource a oe A. The main technical work in our proof of Theorem 1 is be to derive an alternative upper bound for the right hand side in (2) . Specifically, we will work towards showing that for k-uniform congestion games, we have
In order to show inequality (5), some further notation is necessary. A natural way of decomposing the cost of a strategy vector x is to consider the tuples (i, r) with the property that player i uses resource r in strategy x. One may think of such a tuple as a single unit of demand that player i places on resource r under strategy vector x. The cost of a unit of demand is equal to the cost of the corresponding resource under that strategy profile, and the cost of strategy profile is then equal to the sum of the costs of the units of demand. Let
be a subset of the units of demand placed in x NE on the resources in A such that
i.e., for each resource a oe A, P A contains exactly as many units of demand as there are more on these resources in x OPT than in x NE . Similarly, let
Given these definitions, we want to bound the total costs of the units in P B with respect to the total costs of the units in P A . We first identify a subset of these units, for which a simple bound can be obtained, i.e., we identify units of demand (i, a) oe P A and (j,
. For our purposes, it is su cient to do this iteratively in a greedy way, see the greedy cancelling process in Algorithm 1. B for which the condition in the if-loop is satisfied. For our following arguments it is irrelevant, which of these is removed from P A and P B . Let
be the resources that remain over-respectively underdemanded in x NE as opposed to 
For the following arguments, it may be helpful to consult Figure 2 that shows the outcome of the cancelling process and the resulting sets A Õ and B Õ for the congestion game introduced in Example 2.
Let us define
as the set of all units of demand in x NE . The next lemma is the first, crucial ingredient that allows us to obtain improved bounds on the price of anarchy. It states that for each overdemanded unit of demand on a resource in P Õ B , there are "enough" other units on other resources. Subsequently, we are also going to bound the cost of these other units from below. 
I Lemma 5. For a symmetric k-uniform congestion game with a ne cost functions, let P be as in (7) and let (P
. We next bound (9) from below observing that q
Together with the fact that
Given that in (8) we only accounted for units of demand on resources in A Õ , and in (10) we only accounted for units of demand on resources in R \ (A Õ fi B Õ ), we do not count any units of demand twice when lower bounding the number of units
which establishes the result. J
Before we proceed, we provide two structural lemmas which restrict the space of instances with worst-case price of anarchy.
I Lemma 6. The worst-case price of anarchy of symmetric k-uniform congestion games is attained on games that have the property that no resource is chosen by all players both in an optimal strategy vector and a worst-case Nash equilibrium.
The proof is by contradiction and can be found in the appendix. The next lemma is a technical lemma specifically about the structure of worst-case instances with PoA(I) Ø 4/3. Again, the proof is given in the appendix. The restrictions on the structure of worst-case instances obtained in Lemma 7 will be used later in the proof of Theorem 1. Before we can do that, however, we proceed to bound the costs of the resources in A Õ with the following two lemmas. 
I Lemma 7. For any instance I of a symmetric k-uniform matroid congestion game with a ne cost functions and
Since x NE is a Nash equilibrium, no player can improve by choosing a resource r ≠ oe R ≠ instead of r. Thus, all players using r in x NE must also use all resources r ≠ oe R ≠ . This implies in particular that |R ≠ | < k. As any player chooses exactly k resources, she chooses at least one resourcer
. Again, by the Nash property, this implies that all players are using r Õ , so x NE r Õ = n, which contradicts the assumption that x NE r Õ < n. J I Lemma 9. For a symmetric k-uniform congestion game with a ne cost functions, we have
, and x NE a < n for all a oe A Õ as resources in We are now ready to prove our main theorem (Theorem 1).
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 5, for each unit of demand in P Õ B , there are three distinct units of demand in x NE on resources r oe R \ B Õ . We bound the cost of each of these resource units from below by
for any b oe B. Here the first inequality follows directly from the fact that the cost functions are a ne. The second inequality follows from Lemma 8 for resources r with x NE r < n. However, by Lemma 7, it is without loss of generality to assume that no resource r oe R \ B Õ is chosen by all players in x NE , unless the price of anarchy is not larger than 4/3. Therefore, we finally get
Here, the first inequality uses x Combining (12) with Lemma 4 and Lemma 9 yields ÿ
where the first inequality is by Lemma 4, the second by Lemma 9, and the third by (12) . Finally, plugging this into (2) proves Theorem 1. J
Lower Bound
In this section, we show that generalizing the strategy spaces from singletons to k-uniform matroids increases the price of anarchy of congestion games.
I Theorem 10. The price of anarchy of symmetric k-uniform congestion games with a ne cost functions is at least
Proof. We first give a lower bound on the price of anarchy of 47/35 ¥ 1.3428, and then we explain how to extend the example to construct a series of examples for which the price of anarchy converges to 7 ≠ 4 Ô 2 > 1.343. The set of resources is partitioned into 3 sets U , V , and W . The set U consists of two resources with constant cost equal to 1, the set V consists of 6 resources and W consists of 21 resources. Each resource r oe V fi W has costs equal to the number of players using it, i.e., c r (x r ) = x r . There are seven players. Any set which consists of exactly 5 resources is a feasible strategy.
A system optimum solution and a Nash equilibrium for this game is shown in Figure 3 . In the Nash equilibrium, players 5, 6 and 7 each choose five resources from set W and pay in total a cost of 5. The four other players each choose two resources from U and share three resources from V with one other player. Note that none of these players can improve by deviating; all of them already use all resources in U , and all resources V fi W cost at least 2 after a deviation. This equilibrium yields a total cost of 4 ◊ 2 + 15 + 6 ◊ 2 ◊ 2 = 47. In the system optimal strategy vector, each player chooses 2 resources in U , and 3 resources in V fi W such that none of the resources in V fi W is used by more than one player. This yields a total cost of 7 ◊ 5 = 35. We conclude that for this instance the price of anarchy is equal to 47/35 ¥ 1.3428.
We can slightly improve this bound by optimizing over the number of resources contained in the sets U , V , and W . To this end, for some integers p, q oe N, let the set of resources be partitioned into three sets U , V , and W where U consists of q resources with constant cost 1, V consists of p · q resources, and W consists of p(p + q) resources. As before, each resource r in V or W has cost equal to the number of players choosing it, i.e. c r (x r ) = x r . There are p + 2q players. Any set which consists of exactly p + q resources is a feasible strategy. Analogously to the example above, there is a Nash equilibrium where p players choose p + q resources from W (yielding cost p + q for these players), and 2q players choose q resources from U and share p resources from V with one other player. As before, none of these players can improve by deviating; no more resources in U can be chosen, and all resources in V fi W cost at least 2. This equilibrium yields a total cost of p(p + q) + 2q(q + 2p) = p 2 + 5pq + 2q 2 .
In the system optimum, each player chooses q resources in U , and p free resources in V fi W , yielding a total cost of (p + 2q)(p + q) = p 2 + 3pq + 2q 2 . This implies for the price of anarchy of k-uniform congestion games with a ne costs that 
Basic calculus shows that this maximum is attained at x = Ô 2, yielding PoA Ø 7 ≠ 4 Ô 2. For p, q oe Z, we can get arbitrarily close to this value. In our first example p = 3 and q = 2. J
Conclusions
The most interesting open problem, next to improving lower and upper bounds for the k-uniform matroid case we study here, is to analyze the price of anarchy for the generalized problem with arbitrary matroid strategy spaces. 
A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3. For any resource a oe A we have that
by the definition of A, and that the cost-functions are non-decreasing. For any resource b oe B, we have
Here, the inequality uses that the cost function is of the form c b (x) = -x + -with -, -Ø 0 and, thus,
for all b oe B. Finally, for any resource r oe R \ (A fi B) we have that
Summing over all resources yields:
which establishes the claimed result. J Proof of Lemma 6. Let I be an arbitrary symmetric k-uniform congestion game, let x NE be an arbitrary Nash equilibrium of I maximizing C( · ) and let x OPT be an arbitrary strategy vector minimizing C( · ).
Assume there is a resource r used by all players in both x NE and x OPT . We show that resource r can be removed without decreasing the price of anarchy. LetĨ be the symmetric (k ≠ 1)-uniform congestion game that has the same set of players as I, but the set of resources is reduced by r. Consider the strategy vectorx NE inĨ where every player chooses the same resources as in x NE except for r. Thenx NE is a Nash equilibrium inĨ. This implies that the Nash equilibriumx NE with highest cost inĨ has cost
Moreover, letx OPT be the strategy vector ofĨ where all players choose the same resources as in x OPT , except for r. Then the optimality of x OPT for I yields thatx OPT must be optimal forĨ. We have thus established that
Successive elimination of all such resources r yields the claimed result. J
Proof of Lemma 7.
Consider an instance I with resource r oe R \ B Õ that is chosen by all players in a worst-case Nash equilibrium x NE . By Lemma 6, we may assume that r is not chosen by all players in x OPT , which implies x Analogously to the proof Lemma 6, letĨ be the symmetric (k ≠ 1)-uniform congestion games with resource r removed. The strategy vectorx NE inĨ where every player chooses the same resources as in x NE , except for r, is a Nash equilibrium forĨ. It has cost C(x NE )≠c r (n)n. This implies that the Nash equilibriumx NE with highest cost inĨ has cost
We proceed to argue about the cost of an optimal strategy vector forĨ. To this end, note that it is feasible to remove one unit of demand for each player from x OPT . For all players i with r oe x OPT i , we may simply remove the unit of demand put on r (since r is removed anyways). For all other players, by the cancelling process, there is a resource r i , i oe {1, . . . , q} with costs c ri (x OPT ri ) Ø x NE r , so we may remove the unit of demand put on this resource. This yields a feasible solution, and therefore the cost of an optimal strategy vector x OPT forĨ is at most
